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Les ChoristesMovie 2004



The Chorus (French: Les Choristes, literally "The Choristers" or "The Choirboys") is a 2004 French musical drama film directed by Christophe Barratier. Co-written by Barratier and Philippe Lopes-Curval, it is an adaptation of the 1945 film A Cage of Nightingales (La Cage aux rossignols). The story is inspired by the origin of the boys' choir the Little Singers of Paris.




Les choristesMovie | 2004



The soundtrack for The Chorus was released on 3 May 2004 by Warner Bros. Records, and subsequently by Nonesuch Records in 2005 and Varèse Sarabande in 2012. It features the film's original score, which was composed by Bruno Coulais and performed by the Bulgarian Symphony Orchestra (conducted by Deyan Pavlov) and the choir Les Petits Chanteurs de Saint-Marc. The album's 2012 release added five additional tracks, most of which are the orchestral backing tracks of other songs. Filmtracks summed it up by saying "for enthusiasts of boys' choirs and heartwarming, sentimental choral performances in general, The Chorus translates into a strong, albeit repetitive album."[6] The soundtrack topped the albums chart in France for 11 weeks and reached number three in Belgium, before its United States release in early 2005. Around the same time, the live album Les Choristes en concert was released on both CD and DVD.[7]


The Chorus was released on DVD in France (as Les Choristes) on 27 October 2004 by Pathé.[15] On 3 May 2005, Lionsgate released the film on DVD in the United States as The Chorus;[16] on the same day, it was released by Alliance Films in Canada.[17] On 11 July 2005, Pathé released a version with English subtitles in the United Kingdom.[18]


The OSCE's agenda in 2004 was largely set by the decisions taken at the Maastricht Ministerial Council in December 2003, particularly the OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century and the OSCE Strategy Document for the Economic and Environmental Dimension. In light of these decisions, the Bulgarian Chairmanship decided that implementation should be the main theme for the year.


A major topic in 2004 was reform of the OSCE. The Chairmanship also put tolerance and non-discrimination high on its agenda, holding key events on combating anti-Semitism, racism, and xenophobia, and tackling hate speech on the Internet. Intensifying the co-operation between the OSCE and other international organizations engaged in maintaining security and stability in the OSCE area featured prominently in the activities of the Bulgarian Chairmanship.


This analysis uses a consistent pan-Canadian dataset--Canadian CompuScript from IMS Health, Canada--to quantify trends in per capita drug expenditures within each Canadian province over the period of 1998 to 2004. The impacts of changes in six potential determinants of drug expenditure are calculated for every province. Each of the six detailed cost drivers falls into one of three broad categories: volume effects, price effects and therapeutic choices. Despite wide variation in expenditure levels, the rate and causes of provincial expenditure trends over time were roughly comparable. From 1998 to 2004, per capita expenditures on oral solid prescription drugs grew at a rate of over 10% per year in most provinces--several times faster than economic growth over the same period. This rapid expenditure growth has largely been due to increased utilization of medicines and a trend towards prescribing higher-cost drugs over time. Price changes had little impact on drug spending in all provinces.


A history and summary of the allegations in this case may be found in previous memorandum opinions. See United States v. Cuong Gia Le, 311 F. Supp. 2d 527, 528-31 (E.D.Va.2004) (detailed procedural history of the case with respect to defendant Le); United States v. Cuong Gia Le, et al., 310 F. Supp. 2d 763 (E.D.Va.2004) (description of all the indictments in this case up to the Fourth Superseding Indictment). It suffices here to note that Le stands charged with numerous racketeering-related and firearms offenses, including two counts of murder in aid of racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1959(a) (1) and two counts of murder in the course of a firearms offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(j). These charges relate to a shooting at the Majestic Restaurant in Falls Church, Virginia on May 13, 2001 that resulted in the death of two individuals: Binh Anh Luu and Long Phi Nguyen.


There have been two death notices in this case. The original Death Notice set forth two statutory aggravating factors and one nonstatutory aggravating factor. The Amended Death Notice added four nonstatutory aggravating factors and under a category entitled "history of violence" identified nine violent incidents in which Le was allegedly involved, including a murder. Le's attack on the original Death Notice failed. See United States v. Cuong Gia Le, 311 F.Supp.2d. 527, 535 (E.D.Va.2004) (holding that government's original Death Notice was filed a reasonable time before Le's capital trial in accordance with 18 U.S.C. 3593(a)) (interlocutory appeal pending). His attack on the Amended Death Notice, however, succeeded and, as a result, the Amended Death Notice was stricken. See United States v. Cuong Gia Le, 316 F. Supp. 2d 343 (E.D.Va.2004) (holding first that the government failed to make a showing of good cause to file the Amended Death Notice and second that the Amended Death Notice was not filed a reasonable time before trial, as required by 18 U.S.C. 3593(a)).[2] At issue here, given that the Amended Death Notice has been stricken, are two motions: (i) Le's Motion to Strike Aggravating Factors Alleged in Government's Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty; and (ii) Le's Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, to Strike Aggravating Factors Alleged in, Government's Amended Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty. The second motion, inter alia, reiterates the arguments made in the first motion and applies those arguments to the Amended Death Notice. Because the memorandum opinion striking the Amended Death Notice dealt with one of the arguments advanced in the second motion that the government failed to show good cause to amend the original Death Notice that argument will not be addressed again here. The remaining arguments made by Le in *606 the second motion relating to the constitutionality of the FDPA, now that the Amended Death Notice has been stricken, will be construed to apply to the original Death Notice. To the extent that any arguments in the second motion relate to aggravating factors alleged solely in the Amended Death Notice and not in the original Death Notice, those arguments are now moot and need not be addressed here.


To be sure, the Supreme Court has sensibly made clear that heightened reliability is required in capital cases. See, e.g., Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 732, 118 S. Ct. 2246, 141 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1998) (noting that there is an "acute need for reliability in capital sentencing proceedings"); Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 8-9, 109 S. Ct. 2765, 106 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1989) ("The finality of the death penalty requires a `greater degree of reliability' when it is imposed.") (internal citation omitted); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 238-39, 108 S. Ct. 546, 98 L. Ed. 2d 568 (1988) (stating that the "qualitative difference between death and other penalties calls for a greater degree of reliability when the death sentence is imposed"). At the same time, however, "the Supreme Court has also made clear that, in order to achieve such `heightened reliability,' more evidence, not less, should be admitted on the presence or absence of aggravating and mitigating factors." United States v. Fell, 360 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir. 2004). Indeed, in Gregg v. Georgia, the Supreme Court noted that


Ring left open, however, whether the Indictment Clause of the Fifth Amendment[6] requires that a grand jury indict aggravating factors for a defendant to be eligible for the death penalty.[7] In light of the Supreme Court's ruling that aggravating factors "operate as the `functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense,'"[8] thus requiring jury determination, the Fourth Circuit has determined that the Indictment Clause mandates submission of statutory aggravating factors to the grand jury. See United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 298 (4th Cir.2003) ("[T]hose intent and aggravating factors which the government intends to rely upon to render a defendant death-eligible under *610 the FDPA are the functional equivalent of elements of the capital offenses and must be charged in the indictment, submitted to the petit jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."). In this case, the government did precisely this: The list of statutory aggravating factors was submitted to the grand jury, which then returned a Notice of Special Findings. Yet, Le contends that because there is no provision in the FDPA for a Notice of Special Findings, the government cannot cure the constitutional Indictment Clause defect in the statute by simply inventing this Notice of Special Findings procedure out of whole cloth. While Le is correct that nothing in the FDPA requires prosecutors to charge aggravating factors in an indictment, he fails to note, as the Fifth Circuit correctly observed, that nothing in the FDPA prohibits such a procedure and thus "[t]he government can easily comply with both its constitutional obligations (by first going to the grand jury) and its statutory obligations (by later filing a 3593(a) notice of intention to seek the death penalty)." United States v. Robinson, 367 F.3d 278, 290 (5th Cir.2004);[9]cf. United States v. McAllister, 272 F.3d 228, 233 (4th Cir.2001) (noting, while interpreting federal drug statute, that "the mere fact that the statute is silent regarding whether sentencing factors must be treated as elements [of the offense that must be alleged in the indictment and proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt] in order for those factors to increase the defendant's statutory maximum sentence does not make the statute inconsistent with the constitutional requirement that those factors receive that treatment."). Put another way, there is nothing in the FDPA that forbids a grand jury from making special findings concerning aggravating factors. As a result, the statute can be construed to allow the submission of aggravating factors to the grand jury. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 114 L. Ed. 2d 233 (1991) ("A statute must be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional but also grave doubts upon that score."). As a result, the FDPA is neither facially unconstitutional[10] on this score nor unconstitutional as applied to Le in this case. 041b061a72


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